Eperio

Mitigating Technical Complexity in Cryptographic Election Verification



Aleksander Essex, Jeremy Clark
Urs Hengartner, Carlisle Adams*

University of Waterloo,
**University of Ottawa*

EVT/WOTE '10 August 10, 2010

End-to-end elections

- Cryptographic election verification with **strong integrity** and **privacy** assurance
- **Universal** verification:
  - **Anyone** has option to participate

End-to-end elections



CITY COUNCIL MEMBER WARD 3
MIEMBRO DEL CONSEJO DE LA CIUDAD DISTRITO ELECTORAL 3

Rank candidates in order of choice *Clasifique a los candidatos por orden de preferencia*	1st choice *1ra opción*	2nd choice *2da opción*
Dan Robinson		929
Andrew A. Write-In Candidate/*Para añadir a un candidato*	989	

Enhanced Ballot

1st choice *1ra opción*	2nd choice *2da opción*
	929
989	

Receipt

`http://www.election`

```
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 −<object class="java.util.TreeMap">
  −<void method="put">
    <int>0</int>
   −<object class="java.util.Vector">
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          </void>
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        </void>
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            <int>-1</int>
          </void>
         </array>
        </void>
        −<void index="2">
         −<array class="int" length="1">
          −<void index="0">
            <int>-1</int>
          </void>
```

Public audit data

End-to-end elections

- Worldwide research
- Over a dozen elections
- Thousands of voters
- Debut in public-sector
- Growing interest





scantegrity
University of Waterloo
MIT
GSAÉD Élections 2007
Prêt à Voter
CPSR Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
Newcastle University
City of Takoma Park Maryland
The University of Iowa
Punchscan
The University of Surrey Students' Union
claimdemocracy a pro democracy gathering Washington, DC - Nov. 9th to 11th
ACCURATE
Microsoft Research
UNIVERSITÉ DU LUXEMBOURG
VE RI TAS
Universität Karlsruhe (TH) Forschungsuniversität • gegründet 1825
Helios
The George Washington University Washington DC
International Association for Cryptologic Research
The University of Melbourne
NIST
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

End-to-end Elections

- Recent research focused on making E2E:
  - Easy to **vote**
  - Easy to **administer**
- What about easy to **audit**?

End-to-end Elections

- Conflicting views on **cryptography** in **elections**:
  - **Max-crypto**
    - Security at **expense** of inclusiveness
  - **No-crypto**
    - Inclusiveness at **expense** of security
- Our goal:
  - **Min-crypto** ✔
    - **Balance** security and inclusiveness

Eperio

- What it is
  - **E2E** election verification protocol
- What it means for verification
  - Fewer cryptographic **primitives**
  - Smaller **datasets**
  - Faster **execution**
  - Fewer **lines of code**

Consider an optical scan ballot



Consider an optical scan ballot



Let’s add 3 things:







Let’s add 3 things:





Let's add 3 things:



Let's add 3 things:





Marking…




#000
x
Bob
Alice
#001
x
Alice
Bob
Tear off…



…and destroy

Voila. Receipts!

Before the election….

Trustees* copy ballots into a table



Bubble ID	Marked?	Candidate

*Done obliviously

Before the election….

Trustees* copy ballots into a table



Bubble ID	Marked?	Candidate
#000-1st		Bob
#000-2nd		Alice

*Done obliviously

Before the election….

Trustees* copy ballots into a table



Bubble ID	Marked?	Candidate
#000-1st		Bob
#000-2nd		Alice
#001-1st		Alice
#001-2nd		Bob

*Done obliviously

Before the election….

Bubble ID	Marked?	Candidate
#000-1st		Bob
#000-2nd		Alice
#001-1st		Alice
#001-2nd		Bob
…	…	…
…	…	…

And so on…

The Eperio Table:

Bubble ID	Marked?	Candidate
#000-1st		Bob
#000-2nd		Alice
#001-1st		Alice
#001-2nd		Bob
…		…

Remember: it's ***just*** the ballots in table-form.

Trustees shuffle rows



Bubble ID	Marked?	Candidate
#001-2nd		Bob
#003-2nd		Bob
#007-1st		Bob
#029-2nd		Alice
#001-1st		Bob
…		…

Trustees mask columns

Bubble ID	Marked?	Candidate
#001-2nd		Bob
#003-2nd		Bob
#007-1st		Bob
#029-2nd		Alice
#001-1st		Bob
…		…

Cryptographically committed and **published**



Many independent shuffled copies created

More instances scales security assurance

During the election…



Ballots **recorded** by scanner

After the election:

Bubble ID	Marked?
#000-1st	Yes
#000-2nd	No
#001-1st	Yes
#001-2nd	No
…	…

Bubble ID	Marked?	Candidate
#001-2nd	No	Bob
#003-2nd	Yes	Bob
#007-1st	Yes	Bob
#029-2nd	No	Alice
#001-1st	Yes	Alice
…	…	…

Trustees **fill in** middle columns

After the election:

Bubble ID	Marked?
#000-1st	Yes
#000-2nd	No
#001-1st	Yes
#001-2nd	No
…	…

Bubble ID	Marked?	Candidate
#001-2nd	Yes	Bob
#031-2nd	Yes	Bob
#001-1st	Yes	Alice
#029-2nd	No	Alice
#021-1st	Yes	Bob
…	…	…

Trustees **fill in** middle columns

The Audit Challenge



- Challenge
  - Public coin toss
  - **One** column from each instance **challenged**
- Response
  - Trustees post decommitments

Checking receipts

Bubble ID	Marked?	Candidate
	Yes	
	Yes	
	Yes	
	No	
	Yes	
	…	

Checking receipts

Bubble ID	Marked?	Candidate
#007-1st	Yes	
#006-2nd	Yes	
#042-1st	Yes	
#029-2nd	No	
#007-2nd	No	
…	…	

Bubble ID column decommitted

Checking receipts



Voter looks up receipt. Checks for match.

Tally audit

Bubble ID	Marked?	Candidate
	No	
	Yes	
	Yes	
	No	
	Yes	
	…	

Tally audit

Bubble ID	Marked?	Candidate
	No	Bob
	Yes	Alice
	Yes	Alice
	No	Bob
	Yes	Bob
	…	…

Candidate column decommitted

Tally audit

Bubble ID	Marked?	Candidate
	No	Bob
	Yes	Alice
	Yes	Alice
	No	Bob
	Yes	Bob
	…	…



Tally like any election

Repeat as necessary…



Review

- Eperio table instance
  - Just a **copy** of ballots
  - Independently **shuffled**
  - **Committed**
  - **Published**

- Columns
  - Right + middle = **tally**
  - Left + middle = **receipt info**

Bubble ID	Marked?	Candidate
#001-2nd	No	Bob
#003-2nd	Yes	Bob
#007-1st	Yes	Bob
#029-2nd	No	Alice
#001-1st	Yes	Bob
…	…	…

How is Eperio different?

- Table structure
- Commitment scheme
- Implementation options

What does this mean?

- Speed (10-100x faster)
- Data download (10-100x smaller)
- Small code size (50 lines of Python)

Table structure: a comparison

Eperio

Bubble ID	Marked?	Candidate
004 B	X	Bob
008 B	X	Alice
007 A	X	Alice
002 A		Bob
004 A		Alice
008 A		Bob
002 B	X	Alice
007 B		Bob

scantegrity



Verification in a spreadsheet!



Bubble ID	Marked?	Candidate
004 B	X	Bob
008 B	X	Alice
007 A	X	Alice
002 A		Bob
004 A		Alice
008 A		Bob
002 B	X	Alice
007 B		Bob

Bubble ID	Marked?	Candidate
004 B	X	Bob
008 B	X	Alice
007 A	X	Alice
002 A		Bob
004 A		Alice
008 A		Bob
002 B	X	Alice
007 B		Bob



Implementation options

	Custom code	Small script + Encryption utility	Spreadsheet + Encryption utility	Spreadsheet all-in-one?
		python™ OpenSSL	OpenSSL	
scantegrity	✔			
Punchscan	✔			
Helios	✔			
Prêt à Voter	✔			
Eperio	✔	✔	✔	✔

Eperio

Find out more at

eperio.org